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Any adequate account of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda must acknowledge
manipulation by external forces, domestic pressures and psychological fac-
tors. Even so, the nature of the Rwandan state must be seen as absolutely
central. The genocide took place under the aegis of the state, and Rwandans
were the main actors involved. Both precolonial legacies and colonial policies
contributed to the formation of this state, whose increasingly autocratic and
unpopular government was, by the early 1990s, facing serious threats to its
hold on state power, for which genocide represented a last-ditch attempt at
survival. Many of the mechanisms through which genocide was prepared,
implemented and justified in Rwanda bore striking resemblances to those
used during the twentieth century’s other major genocide, the Nazi Holo-
caust against the Jews.
introduction
By 1994, Tutsi in Rwanda, much like Jews in Nazi Germany, were
‘ socially dead’ people, whose murder was as acceptable as it became
common. (Uvin 1997 : 113)
Understanding why they died is the best and most fitting memorial we can
raise for the victims. Letting their deaths go unrecorded, or distorted by
propaganda, or misunderstood through simple cliche! s, would in fact bring the
last touch to the killers’ work in completing the victims’ dehumanisation.
(Prunier 1995 : xii)
Exactly fifty years after the discovery of the Nazi death camps, the
world witnessed genocide in Rwanda. According to a logic better
understood now than at the time, killing of Bahutu political opponents
(the prefix ba- refers to a group of people) and all Batutsi Rwandans
started immediately after Juvenal Habyarimana’s aeroplane was shot
down over the capital, Kigali. The president of Burundi was also killed,
as he was travelling in the same plane. An estimated 5–10 per cent of
Rwanda’s population was then killed ‘between the second week of
April and the third week of May’ 1994 ; ‘one of the highest casualty
* Centre for Development Studies, School of Social Sciences and International Development,
University of Wales Swansea, Singleton Park, Swansea SA2 8PP; h.hintjens!swansea.ac.uk
242 helen m . hintjens
rates of any population in history from non-natural causes ’ (Prunier
1995 : 261, 265). Five years later it is still much too soon to come to any
definite conclusions about what brought about such a remarkable
atrocity; even fifty years later, there is still no consensus emerging on
how to explain the Holocaust of Jews and Gypsies during the Nazi
occupation of Europe. Given how little time has elapsed, it is surprising
there is not more disagreement about how to interpret the 1994
genocide.
In any attempt to explain something as complex as the genocide in
Rwanda, parallels with other situations of mass state murder are
unavoidable. Such parallels are even desirable, if the aim is to identify
the particular dynamics of genocide in a particular case, like that of
Rwanda (Destexhe 1995). An overwhelmingly agrarian society such as
Rwanda cannot easily be compared with the heavily industrialised
Germany of the 1930s, but there are none the less parallels to be drawn
between these two experiences. The similarities lie mainly in the extent
of ideological and military preparation prior to genocide, and in the
systematic use of conspiracy theories and myths to justify covert plans
for slaughter. In both cases, too, more or less pristine theories of ‘ racial
struggle ’ and racial hierarchy became activated and politically charged
during a period of severe economic and social stress. In Rwanda, the
drop in coffee prices in the mid-1980s set off a period of political
extremism and a search for solutions that was to lead to scapegoating
and physical extermination of a large part of the total Rwandan
population. Economic recession was clearly a major facilitating factor
in bringing latent competition and vague murderous intentions to such
organised fruition, both in Nazi Germany and some decades later in
Rwanda.
In Rwanda, racialist ideologies mainly served as a mask or pseudo-
justification for the more fundamental goal of regime survival under
conditions of sharp socioeconomic crisis and growing political oppo-
sition. By mobilising vertical social cleavages, racial and ethnic political
ideologies can be particularly useful to failing regimes facing
widespread opposition from within ‘ their own ranks’. When political
democratisation was imposed on Rwanda in the early 1990s, President
Habyarimana’s regime responded by rallying the majority ‘ faithful ’
against a purported common racial enemy, hoping in this way to
prevent regional and class divisions from finding more open political
expression (Article 19 1995 : 32). A redefinition of national identity
along exclusively racial or ethnic lines thus became the prelude for later
implementation of genocide.
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In contrast with the dearth of relevant research prior to the genocide,
volumes have been written about Rwanda and the Great Lakes region
since 1994. There have been many detailed accounts of exactly what
happened, and some attempts to explain some of the ideological and
historical causes of genocide. Typical of these are the useful accounts of
Chre! tien (1995), Prunier (1995) and Reyntjens (1995). Three broad
types of explanation can be identified from an initial review of the
available literature on genocide in Rwanda. These are as follows: (i) a
focus on external influences, both colonial and neo-colonial ; (ii) a focus
on domestic causes, including demographic factors and ‘ethnic’
conflict ; and (iii) a psychosocial account based on the presumed social
conformism and obedience of Rwandans. In the first account, Rwanda
is seen as particularly vulnerable to colonial and neo-colonial
manipulation. In the second, the country’s overpopulation and social
cleavages are thought to account for the genocide. In the third,
genocide in Rwanda is seen as possible because of an extreme form of
the obedience that is thought to characterise all highly stratified,
relatively stable societies. Elements of each kind of explanation can be
found in most current accounts of the 1994 genocide.
Each type of explanation has some basis in reality, as well as some
blind spots. An emphasis on external factors places responsibility for
genocide elsewhere, and tends to suggest that the Rwandan state and
Rwandan people were merely responding to the divisive logic of
imperialist interventions and strategic withdrawals." Attributing
genocide to domestic causes such as population pressure or ethnic
loyalties again suggests that in organising and carrying out genocide,
Rwandans were merely responding, almost mechanistically, to dom-
estic pressures. The third type of account stresses the dynamics of
obedience and control in the Rwandan social setting, and suggests that
social conformism may be so marked that even genocidal ideologies
may be internalised through obedience, rather than through terror
alone. This tends to reduce the Rwandan experience to a specific and
extreme example of the supposed general human tendency to obey
those in positions of power. All three types of explanations draw
inferences for the Rwanda case from general, and usually highly
contested, principles and theories. On their own, such accounts are not
able to offer new insights into the particular meaning and significance
of the Rwanda genocide of 1994.
The aim of this article is to elaborate a more complex understanding
of the causes of the genocide, which recognises the central role played
by the regime in power, and by Rwandan people themselves. Any
244 helen m . hintjens
adequate account of the 1994 genocide does have to acknowledge
manipulation by external forces, domestic pressures and psychological
factors such as obedience. But the nature of the Rwandan state must be
seen as absolutely central. However externally influenced or motivated
by atavistic loyalties, however obedient to outside forces, the genocide
took place under the aegis of the Rwandan state, and Rwandan
subjects and citizens were the main actors in the genocide (Mamdani
1996). A range of public and private institutions were responsible for
the critical task of planning the genocide in advance, and for ensuring
its subsequent implementation through the participation of most
Rwandan people, resulting in the victimisation of a significant
minority.
This article first examines the legacy of colonial policies, before
treating the genocide as a response to economic and political crisis in
the early 1990s. A particularly lethal combination of obfuscation,
terror and victim blaming is identified as having facilitated genocide in
the particular case of Rwanda. Towards the end of the article, the 1994
Rwandan genocide is set in the context of relations with neighbouring
Burundi. The longer-term legacy of genocide for the Great Lakes
region is not assessed in detail, as it is beyond the scope of this study,
and has been attempted elsewhere (Runtinwa 1996 ; Anacleti 1996 ;
Pottier 1996).
understanding why they died
My own concern with Rwanda dates from the early 1980s, when my
father received a diplomatic posting in Kigali. This made it possible to
visit most parts of the country and observe at first hand what was then
regarded (rightly or wrongly) as an outstanding example of orderly,
well-organised and honestly administered development (see e.g.
Newbury 1992). I had also lived in Tanzania and Kenya, and visited
Burundi and Angola. By comparison, Rwanda in the mid-1980s gave
an impression of extreme orderliness ; this was the ‘Switzerland of
Africa’. In terms of electricity supplies, clean drinking water, clinics,
schools and good roads, Rwandans were relatively well provided for,
even compared with wealthier neighbouring countries. The hilly
terrain was also widely terraced to prevent erosion and maintain soil
productivity. In personal relations there was a sense of restraint and a
lack of candour that could be interpreted as excessive politeness ; much
that was unpleasant was left unsaid. We formed close ties with
Rwandan friends, some of whom have lived with my family in Belgium
the 1994 genocide in rwanda 245
and elsewhere for more than a decade. Knowing them, and knowing
something of what they had to pass through, prompted me to do the
research for this article in the first place.
Since the 1980s, Rwanda’s image has altered drastically, and the
country is now considered just one of many failed states in Africa. The
country’s decline into chaos and conflict is seen as symptomatic of a
widespread inability in the continent to sustain imposed economic and
political reforms. However, if Rwanda can be said to be an example of
a failed state, it is certainly not because the state was weak or
ineffectual ; if anything, the state became so powerful and efficient that
it crushed and overwhelmed Rwandan society completely. Post-
independence Rwanda inherited a legacy of close public scrutiny of all
spheres of life, continuing the former colonial and monarchical state’s
ability to control each individual through a network of controls,
extending from the apex of the regime to its base at household level.
Rwanda illustrates the danger of an efficient and centralised state that
‘does not embrace the entire polis ’, but only ‘ that part which members
of the hegemonic elite think it should embrace’ (Gros 1996 : 460). In
this case, the consequences were disastrous for those not included
among the full citizenry, who ultimately were targeted and hunted
down instead of being protected.
Some accounts of the 1994 genocide have been able to capture its
powerfully tragic meaning for Rwandans themselves (Pottier 1996).
The detailed reports compiled by the London-based NGO, African
Rights (1995), for example, have managed to get close to an
understanding of the way bonds of inter-personal trust and existing
social ties have been almost completely shattered by the experience of
genocide. The bonds within civil society were completely broken in the
process of organising this genocide and ensuring its completion in
record speed and with extreme thoroughness. Imperialist designs of
other countries, the historical legacy of inter-group conflict, and the use
of psychological manipulation and patterns of social control by a highly
authoritarian regime, all have a part to play in any adequate
explanation of the genocide. But even all these combined cannot
explain what happened to Rwandans themselves when the 1994
genocide was planned and implemented. In the words of one author,
‘This was where the spirit withered’ (Keane 1996 : 4).
A strong sense of secrecy and a false air of normality served to disarm
many victims of this genocide. Many Batutsi apparently failed to
anticipate the genocide, in spite of mounting evidence that something
was being planned, and in spite of periodic killings of unarmed Batutsi
246 helen m . hintjens
civilians. Covert actions were an important dimension of the Rwandan
regime’s close political control, and were especially effective in a highly
stratified society, where power differentials had long been taken for
granted (Maquet 1961). When the genocide actually started, it took
most outsiders, and many Rwandans, by complete surprise. Some
prominent extremist politicians and media figures had for some time
openly proclaimed that the Batutsi ‘had it coming to them’, but such
references to some awful future event were generally oblique, relying on
innuendo, insinuation and humour. Bald statements of intent were
rare ; and rumours which circulated of planned genocide simply served
to further disarm the Batutsi population, by appearing to ‘cry wolf ’.
Had they believed genocide possible, many more Batutsi would have
fled the country before April 1994 (Chre! tien 1995 ; Reyntjens 1994). It
is important to explain how it was that the genocide remained an ‘open
secret ’ until the day it began.
genocide, ethnic order and ‘race ’
We can define genocide as ‘a form of one-sided mass killing in which
the state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group
and membership in it are identified by the perpetrator ’ (Mirkovic
1996 : 197 ; Palmer 1998). This is close to the United Nations definition
also used by such agencies as Me!de! cins sans frontie’ res (Destexhe 1995).
A precise definition of genocide has a bearing on the practical question
of how to treat those found responsible for planning and implementing
the killings. Those who contest genocide may suggest that the killings
took place in self-defence, under conditions of civil war. They may
agree that those held responsible should be tried for war crimes, but not
for the crime of genocide, defined as a crime against humanity under
international law (Republic of Rwanda 1995 : 31). Those who have
adopted this position (who are admittedly very few) reject the use of the
term ‘genocide’ to describe the killings in Rwanda in 1994 ; they
include several of the defence lawyers for those accused of genocide by
the International Tribunal in Arusha.
The 1994 killings were a genocide precisely because they were
planned well before April 1994, with predictions of the mass killings
that were to take place being made months, and even years, before they
actually occurred. Certainly, by January 1994, it was clear to the UN’s
special envoy for human rights that death lists were being drawn up in
preparation for the killing of Batutsi, and the elimination of Bahutu
opposition politicians and human rights activists (FIDH 1993 : 4;
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Reyntjens 1995 : 59). From 1992 onwards, members of ‘Hutu power’
militias were being trained in techniques of hunt and destroy
operations, rather than in open armed combat. The regime in power in
Rwanda during the early 1990s, along with its regional and
international allies, was fully responsible for the genocide of 1994.
This article will attempt to demonstrate that this genocide
represented a last-ditch attempt by an increasingly autocratic and
unpopular regime to cling on to state power, whatever the costs for the
population at large. In no sense, therefore, was the genocide the result
of spontaneous fighting between two competing castes or ethnic groups.
The majority of those killed in Rwanda in 1994 were ‘ the small rural
Tutsi from the Hills [who] were in no way different from their Hutu
neighbours ’ (Prunier 1995 : 249). Since at least the 1950s, average
Batutsi and Bahutu have been identical in the language they speak, in
their religious beliefs, in their educational and income levels, and in the
acres they farm and the number of children they bear. Both in height
and looks, differences between Bahutu and Batutsi are not as clear-cut
as most historical and anthropological accounts suggest. There is a
common notion that it is easy to detect the Bahutu majority and the
Batutsi and Batwa minorities on the basis of physical appearance
alone.# This is certainly not true. During the genocide, for example,
frequent ‘mistakes ’ were reportedly made. In addition, the official
definition of a person’s ethnic identity was traced exclusively through
the male line, an obvious weakness given the difficulty of establishing
paternity, compared with maternity. Mixed marriages have been
common for centuries, particularly in the south of Rwanda, resulting in
many people who resemble neither the physical stereotype of the
Tutsi nor of the Hutu.
After independence, those officially classified as Batutsi were
subjected to strict quotas in secondary and higher education, and in
public employment. For Batutsi women, there was now a strong
incentive to marry a Bahutu man, so that one’s children might escape
such tight controls. Never physically segregated or ghettoised, but
living in dispersed housing amongst Bahutu, the Batutsi were made to
feel disadvantaged, and constantly reminded that they were erstwhile
exploiters, who were lucky to be left in peace to get on with their
business. Historically, the Batutsi aristocracy certainly considered
themselves inherently superior to the Bahutu, and this notion extended
to the poorest Batutsi (a situation which persists even today in
neighbouring Burundi). Even before independence and the removal of
the monarchy, there was no significant economic difference between
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Bahutu and Batutsi (Prunier 1995 : 50). After independence, Rwandan
Batutsi came to be confined to a strictly limited sphere of influence, as
the Bahutu elite gradually took over the reins of power from the Batutsi
monarchy and the Belgian trusteeship power.
From the start of the genocide in April 1994, the international media
tended to portray the genocide as resulting from ethnic tensions.
Domestically, the official line was that killings were the result of clashes
between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Rwandan
Armed Forces (FAR). State propaganda was designed to raise the
hackles of the Bahutu population, and, during the early stages of
genocide, there was little evidence of overt hostility from Bahutu
towards their Batutsi neighbours and relatives. Such hatred and fear
was sometimes latent, and could be manipulated, but more commonly
it was deliberately created in the context of well-prepared massacres.
Among the thousands of ordinary Rwandans who carried out the
genocidal killings, most were Bahutu. There was also a tiny number of
Batutsi who had changed or disguised their identity.$ It should also be
acknowledged that many Bahutu tried to protect their fellow
Rwandans, Bahutu and Batutsi alike, from being killed. A few
succeeded (Mamdani 1996 : 23). Neither the RPF invasion in 1990, nor
the onset of severe economic crisis in the early 1990s, had provoked
spontaneous inter-communal violence between Bahutu and Batutsi in
Rwanda. This does suggest that ethnic conflict was quite deliberately
engineered in the run-up to the genocide, as attacks on Batutsi
increased. By definition, a conscious and deliberate state strategy like
genocide cannot be attributed to spontaneous outbursts of mutual
antagonisms between ethnic or racial groups. Genocide may well
exploit such latent antagonisms, and may create new ones, but it
cannot be caused by such divisions.
Both before and after the violence of the 1959–62 Revolution,
Rwanda had a complex and highly stratified social structure, both in
terms of class and status. By the time of independence in 1962, an
estimated 10,000 Batutsi had been killed and ten times that number
had been forced to flee the country. In spite of the overthrow of the
Mwami (king) and Tutsi aristocratic rule, most Rwandans’ attitudes to
authority changed very little after independence. At least until the
genocide, individuals continued to demonstrate quite a remarkable
degree of internalised social control in relation to their superiors, and
domination was considered the order of the day for subordinates
(Lemarchand 1970). Intense family socialisation, and intrusive state
regulations into every sphere of daily life, reinforced this overall
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impression of orderliness and tight social control. This could perhaps
help to explain how plans for genocide were kept largely covert. Such
secrecy also facilitated widespread participation in the implementation
of the genocide. On their own, secrecy and subservience cannot
account for the Rwandan state’s decision deliberately to direct
organised social and political energies at the specific, lethal goal of
Batutsi genocide and killing of Bahutu political opponents. Ultimately,
by redirecting the population’s strong sense of social solidarity and
cultural cohesion towards a common ‘racial ’ enemy within the
country, the political architects of the 1994 genocide were to destroy
almost totally any sense of social cohesion within Rwanda.
Research into the Rwandan media during the early 1990s suggests
that a ‘hard core’ within the regime, concentrated in the army, did
prepare for genocide. This faction feared for its own survival under
any power-sharing arrangement with the RPF, and apparently
resolved not to give up without a fight to the death. This provides us
with the beginnings of an explanation of the 1994 genocide: as a state-
organised incitement to violence, imposed through terror and ideology,
and directed against the minority Batutsi and their perceived allies
among the Bahutu. The main organisers were a northern Bahutu elite,
united by their senior positions in the army and the top civil service.
The initial goal was regime survival, and the means to achieve this was
to be as complete as possible elimination of the perceived ‘racial ’
enemy. Since the genocide, a new goal has emerged: to extend Bantu
control (for which read Bahutu dominance) throughout eastern central
Africa. The goal had become to oust the Hamitic ‘race’ (for which read
the Batutsi) once and for all from their perceived position of dominance
in the region. This is perhaps the single most disturbing legacy of the
1994 Rwanda genocide: a sharp racialisation of political discourse,
unprecedented in the Great Lakes Region since the early era of direct
European colonisation.
tangled roots
The practice of tracing official Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa identities
through the male line was initially an administrative device introduced
for convenience by the Belgians in 1933. This method of deriving a
single ethnic label for each individual contradicted the complex ways
in which social identities were constructed over time throughout the
Great Lakes region. Historically, for example, the terms Bahutu and
Batutsi were used in relation to each other, and more flexibly than later
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came to be the case. It is reported by Lemarchand (1996 : 9–10), for
example, that in pre-colonial Burundi, the same individual could be
both Tutsi in relation to clients, and Hutu in relation to patrons. The
pre-colonial Rwandan kingdom was divided into more than a dozen
clans, each of which included Batutsi, Bahutu and Batwa members. On
rare occasions, until the 1920s or so, a man born Hutu could be
ennobled and lose his Hutu-ness ; Bahutu and even Batwa were very
occasionally appointed lords of the land. But Batutsi controlled the
corresponding positions of lord of the army and lord of the cattle almost
exclusively (see Reyntjens 1996 : 182–4 ; Maquet 1961 : 173–85).
As Albert Memmi (1991 : 31) reminds us, ‘ roots can be very tangled
things ’, something not allowed for in the simple and pseudo-tribal legal
classification of identity in Rwanda since colonial times. A fairly
flexible use of Tutsi, Hutu and Twa identity categories was replaced
with a more rigid ethnic or ‘racial ’ interpretation of such identity
groups. This hardening of ethnic boundaries resembled the tribalisation
of class and caste relations elsewhere in colonial Africa (Wallerstein
1991 : 198). Mixed Hutu–Tutsi or Hutu–Twa backgrounds were
ignored, although terms such as ‘Hutsi ’ continued to be used informally
to indicate the intermediate social identification of mixed Rwandans
(and Burundians).
Hardened identity boundaries caused changes in attitudes towards
mixed marriages and concubinage, particularly between Bahutu and
Batutsi. The subterranean world of inter-group sexual relations started
to be more openly and critically discussed for the first time in the run-
up to the genocide, coming to be regarded as a matter of public concern
rather than part of a family’s private affairs. During the colonial and
pre-colonial eras, concubinage of Hutu women by Tutsi overlords, akin
to the European mediaeval droit de seigneur, was practised both in
Rwanda and in Burundi. After independence, the Rwandan Hutu
political elite tended to choose wealthy Tutsi women as marriage
partners and mistresses. This provided the new political elite with
useful economic ties, but also reinforced an undercurrent of sexual
jealousy and resentment among poorer Bahutu men and women.
Sexual resentments were expressed in ‘ethnic’ terms in the media, and
jealousy of Batutsi was fully exploited in the hate campaign conducted
during the early 1990s. The Tutsi aristocracy’s erstwhile proprietorial
use of Hutu women was not yet forgiven, and the sin was now seen as
compounded by Batutsi women’s supposed seduction of Bahutu elite
men (Maquet 1961 : 77–80 ; Codere 1973). The prevalence of
Hutu–Tutsi intermarriage and mixing, far from softening attitudes,
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served as an excuse for indignation and sentimental appeals to the
honest Hutu volk not to marry the enemy ‘race’.
The notion of two exclusive and incompatible Hutu and Tutsi
identities was constructed gradually, by exploiting every possible
source of frustration of the Bahutu majority. How such identities came
to be perceived as polar opposites, where once they had been based on
material relations of unequal but mutual inter-dependence, is an
interesting question. The reworking of social identities in Rwanda and
Burundi from the early twentieth century appears to be an outstanding
example of what Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1983) call the
‘ invention of tradition’. Lemarchand (1996 : 30) similarly uses the
notion of self-fulfilling prophecy to describe the way in which reality in
Rwanda and Burundi gradually came to resemble myths of racial
incompatibility originating in the colonial period. Myths of racial and
ethnic origins can come to be acted upon as if they were true; this does
not make such myths any less mythical, but it does give them the power
to fashion people’s behaviour. This form of power deserves closer
scrutiny in attempts to explain the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, and
current conflicts in the Great Lakes Region.
As Jean-François Bayart (1993 : 56) suggests, it is important not to
exaggerate the importance of the ethnic factor. Such identities may be
printed on people’s papers, or may dominate people’s perceptions of a
conflict situation, but they cannot in and of themselves be the root
cause of conflict or violence; they are the way that political conflicts are
expressed. Ideologies that promote ethnic identities as primordial tend
to gain prominence when underlying structural schisms latent within a
society become apparent in a way that threatens the position of the
political power bloc. In line with this broad approach to explaining
‘ethnic politics ’, I will try to show that genocide in Rwanda was caused
not by ethnic conflict as such or by external intervention, nor by
obedience per se, but by a series of state responses to a deeper structural
crisis. What Peter Uvin (1997) has termed the structural violence of the
state was mobilised in the economic, political and ideological spheres.
In the most profound sense, the genocidal project was a reaction to a
deep-rooted crisis of state legitimacy in Rwanda.%
A historical account of the influence of German and Belgian colonial
rule is part of any adequate explanation of the 1994 genocide in
Rwanda. Yet to try to establish what ‘really happened’, and distinguish
this from the ‘mythical ’ past, is a quixotic exercise. Mamdani (1996 :
8) has expressed this point succinctly : ‘much of what passed as
historical fact in academic circles has to be considered tentative – if not
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outright fictional – as the post-genocidal sobriety compels a growing
number of historians to take seriously the political uses to which their
writings have been put’. The outlines of some possible explanations can
be highlighted, but sharp disagreement will inevitably continue about
how to interpret historical accounts of Rwandan socioeconomic and
political structures.
german and belgian legacies
One much-disputed historical ‘ fact ’ is the migration theory of the
origins of the Batutsi, Bahutu and Batwa. According to early German
accounts, the tall Batutsi monarchs were supposed to have descended
from (Bahima) invaders who came from Ethiopia, or the Middle East,
and to have set up relations of dominance over the indigenous (Bantu)
Bahutu farmers and the Batwa hunter-gatherers. The immigration of
Batutsi was thought to have taken place in the twelfth or thirteenth
century. According to this historiography, the Batutsi of Rwanda and
Burundi (as well as other groups seen as racially related) are not really
indigenous Africans at all, as are the ‘Bantu’ Hutu and ‘pygmoid’
Twa. In 1865, the Nile explorer John Hanning Speke first sought to
demonstrate the superiority of the ‘noble, aristocratic ’ kingships of the
inter-lacustrine zone over the Bantu peoples around them, over whom
they generally ruled (Prunier 1995 : 10–11).
Later missionaries and adventurers continued to concoct fantastical
theories of the origins of the Batutsi, also known as ‘Hamites ’,
descended from the cursed son of Noah. There were gross exaggerations
of the physical disparity in size between Bahutu and the taller Batutsi,
with the aristocratic minority invariably being compared with the
majority of farmers and servants (for such an account, see Gunther
1955 : 672–7). The still partly hunter-gatherer Batwa minority group,
composing just 1 per cent of the population, completed the racialised
image of a society stratified in terms of status, occupation, physiology,
and supposedly in terms of origin as well. Alternatives to the Hamitic
migration theories have been proposed to explain the observable (but
often greatly exaggerated) physical differences between the three social
groups composing Rwandan society. Walter Rodney (1972 : 134–41),
for example, stressed that dietary differences might play a part in
creating differences in stature between the aristocracy and the
peasantry. Such differences might also reflect the polarisation of a
previously fluid and mixed society into a more sharply hierarchical and
caste-based set of social structures (see Mamdani 1996).
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During colonial rule, church, school, administration and the army
were organised around the assumed racial superiority of the Batutsi.
The notion of inherited and immutable inter-racial differences in
ability and make-up bolstered what was seen as a pre-colonial ‘premise
of inequality ’, on which inter-lacustrine aristocracies had long based
their claims to legitimacy (Maquet 1961). European religious and
racial value systems thus came to be superimposed on earlier divine
interpretations of the earthly social order. The idea of race lent spurious
scientific credence to the idea that Hutu and Tutsi identities arose from
separate sources, rather than being part of a single social system of class,
status and occupation. In the 1920s, the triple offices of land, cattle and
army overlord were combined into a single position, which became
confined to Batutsi alone (Codere 1973 : 353 ; Prunier 1995 : 45–6).
When identity cards were introduced in 1933, this created problems,
since it was impossible to know for sure who belonged to which ‘racial ’
group. According to one account (which may be apocryphal), Belgian
colonial administrators so despaired of being able to distinguish Batutsi
from Bahutu, that they introduced a means-tested system of ethnic
identification. Any man with more than ten head of cattle was to be
permanently classified as Tutsi, and any man with fewer than ten cattle
as Hutu or Twa, depending on their profession (Van der Meeren 1996 :
253–5 ; Destexhe 1995 : viii). Several sources report this as an account
of what happened at that time, yet some Rwandans claim it as just
another invented historical ‘ fact ’.
Ultimately, colonial institutions based on racial theories of im-
mutable differences proved subversive of Batutsi and monarchical
hegemony. The emerging Bahutu elite came to express its search for a
political role in racial terms, and Catholicism gave added impetus to
this crystallisation of a sense of group oppression and resentment
against the Batutsi en masse. Subservience to Batutsi overlordship had
lost any voluntary character it might have had in the pre-colonial era,
and had also lost its ethical and moral overtones as traditional religion
had been replaced by Catholicism. Early on during Belgian rule, overt
rebellion against Batutsi overlordship was rare, since relations of
clientship provided some economic security and protection for many
Bahutu. By the 1950s, the prevailing system of ‘exploitative reciprocity’
had become less reciprocal and more overtly exploitative. Rebellion
against forced labour, ubuhake, became widespread, especially in
Rwanda (Lemarchand 1970).& By 1959, when the ‘Revolution’ started
in Rwanda, clientship ties between Bahutu and Batutsi had been
emptied of much of their previous economic and ideological content.
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Not only were Hutu–Tutsi relations more overtly coercive and
exploitative than before, but the Batutsi and the Mwami came
increasingly to be identified with an unjust ‘ racial ’ social order, which
was seen as colonial and therefore as no longer acceptable. In economic
terms, as Ian Linden (1977 : 187) puts it : ‘The vast interlocking
network of relationships in whose interstices Hutu found protection and
rose to power was gone’, and had largely been replaced by the Belgian
colonial economy, geared to coffee production and cash crops.
The Belgians ’ desire for administrative and ideological simplicity
was to have lasting consequences for generations of people living in the
Great Lakes region. Most obviously, ethnic markers on all identity
cards made it possible to identify Batutsi and implement quotas, and
ultimately to implement selective killings (Bayart 1994 ; Destexhe
1995 : 31). By introducing Christianity and ‘tidying up’ Rwandan
social groups, Belgian colonial administration cut across mechanisms of
social cohesion, including the religious belief system and clan structures.
This created a monolithic division between Hutu and Tutsi identities,
and started to dissolve the ideological glue of Rwandan monarchical
society.
As a new class of educated Bahutu started to demand majority rule
and ‘racial ’ self-determination, they were encouraged to do so by a
new generation of Belgian officials, clergy and soldiers. An interesting
possibility, so far little explored in the literature, is that Hutu–Tutsi
relations became a vehicle for inter-Belgian rivalries between Flemish
and Walloons at that time (Linden 1977 ; Braeckman 1996 ; Uvin
1997). After the Second World War, many more Flemish officials and
priests were appointed to the colonial service. Posted to Rwanda, they
tended to identify with the Hutu underdogs against the Tutsi rulers,
whom they may have equated with the Walloon elite in Belgium,
perceived as snobbish and effete. For whatever reasons, a new
generation of Belgian officials and clergy emerged after 1945 and
identified more strongly with the Bahutu cause, possibly because of the
projection of Flemish feelings of resentment at Walloon domination
onto the (completely different) situation of polarisation in what was
then Ruanda-Urundi.’ Not surprisingly, this is disputed by some
Flemish scholars, notably Filip Reyntjens.
Gradually, the Bahutu elite came to regard itself as the only
authentic indigenous leadership of Rwanda, and the Bahutu as the
only true ‘ sons of the soil ’. Curiously, this claim of historical legitimacy
ignored the prior claims of the minority Batwa, almost certainly the
earliest inhabitants of the Great Lakes area. During the years prior to
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independence, the image of the Batutsi had thus been transformed from
a proud and noble aristocracy to a lazy, parasitic and cruel pastoral
‘ race’, alien conquerors to boot. The Mwami was deposed shortly
before independence in 1962, and from 1961 to 1962 the Belgian
trusteeship authorities oversaw the replacement of half of all Batutsi
chiefs by Bahutu chiefs. The negotiated end of Belgian rule took place
in 1962, and to the rising Bahutu elite the Belgians must now have
seemed like allies in the fight against Batutsi hegemony. It had become
obvious by the late 1950s that the Belgians were prepared to abandon
their erstwhile Batutsi allies to their fate. The coloniser now
championed the cause of the ‘ little man’, the Bahutu majority
(Lemarchand 1970 : 179 ; Linden 1977 : 220–8). Political opportunism
and growing fears of Tutsi radicalism and pan-African nationalism no
doubt prompted this line. The net result, as Uvin (1997 : 94–6) argues,
was that another tribe, the fourth tribe of the inter-lacustrine area,
became the only social group not to suffer from the violence that
preceded independence. This was the white tribe, the Bazungu.
At independence, Rwanda’s Hutu elite was led by Abbe! Kagame!
and the future president, Gre! goire Kayibanda. The ‘Bahutu Mani-
festo ’ of February 1957 expressed the Hutu elite’s desire to end Tutsi
dominance once and for all. This document was fairly moderate,
however, since it recognised that poor Tutsi shared many of the
problems of poor Hutu; it also included the Twa in its demands for
human rights for all Rwandans. However, the Bahutu Manifesto
defended the need for racial markers on identity cards, and asked that
these be retained after independence as a protective measure (Codere
1973 : 350–1).
The idea of a hierarchy of races had far more devastating
implications in Rwanda and Burundi than could ever have been
imagined by the early European explorers and ethnographers who first
propounded such theories (Chre! tien 1995 : 321–30 ; Prunier 1995 :
7–11). The supposedly foreign origins of the Batutsi, once used to
defend their inherent right to rule, were now being used to justify plans
to drive them out of Rwanda. A key hate speech was made in 1992 by
a leading Hutu power politician, Leon Mugesera, who heralded the
genocide when he said that all Tutsi should be sent ‘back home to
Ethiopia’ where they supposedly came from. Their destination was to
be reached ‘via Nyaborongo (river) on an express trip’ (Chre! tien
1995 : 56 ; Article 19 1995 : 38–40). When the genocide did take place
just two years later, tens of thousands of Rwandans’ dead bodies did
float down the Nyaborongo river, almost all of them Tutsi or part
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Tutsi. Most were buried by Ugandans who recovered the bodies on the
shores of Lake Victoria (where it is reported that Ugandans refused to
touch tilapia fished in the lake for some years afterwards).(
planning genocide as an escape from cris i s
The combined impact of the end of the Cold War and of structural
adjustment policies has been to further marginalise sub-Saharan Africa
within the global economy. Before the mid-1980s, Rwanda’s govern-
ment had managed to avoid becoming heavily indebted. To most
observers, it appeared that ‘ the economy [was] on the whole well
managed. The money was stable and levels of inflation, foreign debt
and corruption were all low’ (Waller 1996 : 34). More than 90 per cent
of the population lived in rural areas, but even for them Rwanda had
achieved impressive levels of services, including drinking water,
electricity, primary education and basic health care. By the early
1990s, 70 per cent of the population had access to clean drinking water,
there was a good road network in all regions, and local clinics and
schools operated in the main towns of each district (Waller 1996 : 9).
This situation started to deteriorate when coffee prices fell in 1986–7 ;
receipts from coffee sales tumbled from 14 billion to 5 billion Rwanda
francs in a single year (ACR 1989 :B377 ; Chossudovsky 1997 ; Prunier
1995 : 123). External debt soon started to accumulate, and this was
almost entirely due to unfavourable external conditions rather than
domestic mismanagement. Despite this, the solution proposed was no
different than for governments that had been blatantly corrupt and
incompetent, like those of Zaire or Kenya.
As Rwanda’s trade deficit accumulated, existing redistributional and
welfare policies came under increasing pressure. These had been based
on the construction of social cohesion among Bahutu through the
imposition of ethnic quotas, and a high degree of economic control of
producers and pricing. President Habyarimana liked to champion the
cause of the ‘ little man’. Although he made a point in his speeches of
including both agriculturists and herders in his definition of the little
man, he also lambasted parasitic traders and misguided intellectuals
who exploited the little man and undermined social cohesion (Newbury
1992 : 193–219 ; Van der Meeren 1996 : 257). Strict ethnic quotas
continued to apply both in the civil service and in education, and the
army was almost entirely Bahutu. Reading between the lines of such
political rhetoric, the economic crisis was being blamed on a conspiracy
of traders, merchants and intellectuals, professions in which Batutsi
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tended to specialise. Already, Tutsi economic and professional success
was eliciting envy from the Bahutu elite. Until the early 1990s, Batutsi
business people were allowed to operate relatively freely in private
business and in the professions, but were strictly limited in terms of
access to public office or official state employment. An uneasy
coexistence had emerged between the political and administrative
Bahutu elite and the economic Batutsi elite, but this broke down with
the RPF invasion from Uganda in 1990, and the resulting panic among
the Bahutu political class.
The RPF invasion also coincided with the start of structural
adjustment policies. In June 1990, the government finally yielded to
World Bank}IMF pressure to implement a package of structural
adjustment measures. Rwanda’s national currency was immediately
devalued by two-thirds (Waller 1996 : 33). There was also famine in the
south of the country, and farmers’ real incomes, which had already
been slashed in 1986–7, were further eroded. Budgetary shortages and
high import costs meant that health services could not be maintained,
and maternal and infant mortality levels rose sharply (Le Monde, 6
April 1994). In the immediate prelude to the genocide, there was a
dramatic increase in malaria, combined with severe food shortages and
an influx of refugees from Burundi. All these changes dramatically
worsened the lives of most Rwandans.
At the same time, something new was emerging as an indirect result
of the RPF invasion: a militarisation of Rwandan state expenditure,
and growing corruption among the political elite. The army increased
in size from 7,000 troops in 1989 to more than 30,000 by 1994, and, in
1992, emergency financial assistance provided to the government to
pay for essential food and drug imports was reportedly diverted into
arms purchases (Lemarchand 1994 : 600 ; Chossudovsky 1997 : 118).
French military assistance worsened levels of corruption and en-
couraged further purchases of military hardware at the expense of
many basic necessities. There was also a rapid para-militarisation of
Rwandan society, with the creation of hundreds of civil defence
associations and covert death squads, all dedicated to fighting the RPF
and ‘their allies ’ (Human Rights Watch 1994). New forms of army and
civilian corruption made an appearance, including drug dealing and
money laundering. For example, in the early 1990s, according to
Reyntjens (1995 : 30–1), both the son of French President François
Mitterrand, Jean-Christophe, and Habyarimana’s son, Jean Pierre,
were found guilty of drug trafficking, but neither was sentenced.
By early 1994, agricultural production was in severe crisis and food
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production had declined. As food imports rose and the currency was
devalued, a trade gap emerged, with export revenue covering barely
one third of the import bill. Food was in short supply, but with
growing demand from the military, beer production increased (EIU
1994 : 25 ; Reyntjens 1993 : 701). Instead of heeding the critical choices
and sharing power with opposition parties, so that funds would be
released by the World Bank, extremist politicians and military, as well
as some powerful business and media interests, set their faces towards
genocide as the only ‘final solution’ to their problems. The economic
impact of genocide was immediately disastrous ; killing started in the
planting season, with the result that the 1994 harvest was less than half
its 1993 level. By June 1994, almost all the cattle in Rwanda were dead
(Tardif-Douglin 1996 : 268 ; Nteziliyo 1995 : 319–38). Replanting
started almost at once on return, but farms were in ruins (Pottier 1996).
The devastating economic consequences of falling commodity prices
and IMF and World Bank policies were not confronted, because of
feared financial repercussions. Instead the woes of the country were
blamed squarely on the RPF and their allies, the Batutsi ‘enemy
within’, who together were charged with full responsibility for
Rwanda’s woeful condition. As economic and political crisis bit harder,
the regime’s enemies came to include an ever-widening circle of people,
incorporating not only the RPF and all Rwandan Batutsis but
eventually all ‘moderate ’ Bahutus, and anyone suspected of supporting
the Arusha Accords (Chre! tien 1995 ; Guichaoua 1995 ; Article 19
1996).
Under the terms of the Arusha Accords, progress was to be made on
the democratisation of political life. In early 1994, an Economist
Intelligence Unit report (1994 : 24) emphasised the high cost if the
government failed to comply: ‘while there is a political stalemate,
Rwanda cannot access the $30m due to it under the Structural
Adjustment Programme, due to expire on April 23 ’. The imposition of
such rigid political conditionality on Rwanda’s government hastened
moves towards a violent ‘final solution’ to the country’s severe
socioeconomic and political problems. Chossudovsky (1997 : 119) has
pointed to the irresponsibility of imposing such conditions, given the
‘ likely political and social repercussions of economic shock therapy
applied to a country on the brink of civil war’. The Rwandan
government’s refusal to comply with the requirements of the Arusha
Accords was to have devastating consequences. There were moves to
include the political opposition parties in an interim government, but
no steps were taken to incorporate RPF forces into the army, one of the
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conditions of the peace settlement. At the same time, a deteriorating
human rights record, and worsening socioeconomic conditions, fed into
the growth of domestic political opposition, and it was becoming more
and more obvious that the regime could no longer protect or provide
for most Rwandans.
between democracy and the devil
It may be noted that when democratic political reforms were
introduced in 1991, political divisions in Rwanda did not coalesce
along ethnic lines. Instead, with the dismantling of the one-party state,
long-standing tensions surfaced between northern Bahutu elites and
those from the south of the country. Southerners generally resented the
dominance of a small group of Bahutu northerners in control of the top
echelons of the army and administration, whilst northern Bahutu
considered themselves purer ethnically, and historically less subservient
to the Batutsi than the predominantly ‘mixed’ southerners. Quotas
applied in terms of ethnic origin, but Bahutu from the south were also
discriminated against in access to public services and employment.
Rwandans from Gisenyi and Bushiru were generally perceived as a
privileged elite in terms of their relations with state institutions (see
Map 1). This included preferential access to higher education and
public sector jobs at a time of shrinking state revenues (Prunier 1995 :
123 ; Van der Meeren 1996 : 258).
In this context, a ‘ small house ’ (translated as akazu) of senior
military and civilian officials emerged, centred on the powerful clan of
Agathe, the president’s wife. The akazu started to organise itself
politically and militarily in the early 1990s. Claiming historical
legitimacy from a long line of independent Hutu kingships located in
north-west Rwanda, this group had tight control over President
Habyarimana’s extensive networks of political patronage. By the early
1990s, akazu members had come to dominate the most strategic
positions both in central ministries and in regional government. The
growing dominance of this small group of Bahutu northerners over
every sphere of Rwandan life came to be deeply resented as the
economic recession deepened, and this led to an upsurge in support for
opposition political parties. There was a rewriting of Rwandan history,
assisted by the university history professor, Ferdinand Nahimana. His
studies of pre-colonial Bahutu kingships in the north-west of Rwanda
provided the intellectual respectability and historical legitimacy that
the akazu craved, by supporting their claims of Bantu purity (Independent
on Sunday 8 January 1995 ; Guichaoua 1995 : 610–13).)
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Map 1 Rwanda
In a letter of resignation to the MRND in July 1992, Christopher
Mfizi (appointed by the RPF as Rwandan ambassador to Paris in
August 1994, though soon replaced by a more ‘ loyal ’ representative)
christened the akazu and their representatives in the army and civil
service ‘Re! seau Ze! ro’. The reference seems almost deliberately obscure,
since Mfizi borrows a term used by Roland Barthes to describe the
written word; without this ‘Re! seau Ze! ro’ nothing could be expressed
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and nothing could be said (Guichaoua 1995 : 617–20). The regime’s
determination to remain in power gradually led to the defensive
creation of a ‘ state within a state ’, centred on control of paramilitary
youth organisations, which operated in tandem with the army and
other state institutions at national, district and municipal levels. As the
paid militias of young men grew, fewer and fewer Rwandan people
benefited from the protection and patronage of the Rwandan state.
This created a distinct ‘crisis of clientelism’, comparable to that
identified elsewhere in post-colonial Africa (Allen 1995 ; Drame 1996).
For the akazu, and especially senior figures in the military, the
Arusha Accords ’ requirement that the RPA (Rwandan Patriotic
Army) be incorporated within the Rwandan Armed Forces, and be
allocated 40 per cent of all officer posts, was seen as the last straw
(Prunier 1995 : 159–64). This condition was interpreted as openly
hostile to the already beleaguered Rwandan regime, in a context in
which declining state revenues and job losses raised serious worries
about the future economic security of the Bahutu state bourgeoisie. An
association of senior military officers, known as AMASASU, violently
rejected the Arusha Accord proposals for military integration. This
association mainly represented the northern Bahutu officers who
dominated higher levels of the military (Reyntjens 1995 : 58).
A vibrant press emerged in Rwanda almost immediately after state
controls were relaxed in 1991. Criticism of clannish northern
dominance in political life and the army was expressed publicly for the
first time. Increasing problems of corruption in the army and civil
service were exposed by journalists, often at considerable personal risk
(Newbury 1992 : 213–15). The ‘Gisenyi boys ’ responded by banning
papers, taking them over, and distributing counter-information. A
huge public demonstration took place in Kigali in January 1992,
calling on President Habyarimana to implement the Arusha Accords.
The regime’s supporters claimed that the RPF had organised the
demonstration, and stated that ‘democratisation’ was being used as a
cover for the restoration of Batutsi hegemony and feudalism (Chretien
1995 : 38–55, 258–60). Unless the inyenzi (cockroaches) and their allies
were defeated once and for all, the old feudal order could come back
to haunt the Rwandan Hutu majority. Interestingly, the term inyenzi is
not as negative as it sounds, and was first used by Batutsi exiles in the
1960s to describe themselves, because of their practice of conducting
cross-border raids under cover of darkness.
The myth of an on-going, ‘racial ’ struggle for supremacy was
revitalised with a vengeance for election campaigns. Ordinary Bahutus
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who had lived peacefully next to ordinary Batutsis were now expected
to realise how dangerous those neighbours could be (African Rights
1996 : 9–15).* During each election campaign, a cultivated climate of
fear undermined most peaceful opposition to the regime, all of which
came to be falsely equated with tacit support for the RPF. The
Rwandan Tutsi and Hutu political opposition were ultimately to pay
the price for this suppression of overt inter-Bahutu political con-
frontation; their death was the price required to ensure the continued
dominance of northern Bahutu elites, and to paper over any inter-Hutu
divisions. Religious images of suffering and sacrifice were often invoked
in the propaganda around the time of the genocide (Chre! tien 1995 :
321). Southern Bahutu elites and the poor majority were told again
and again that differences of class, region and politics were superficial
compared with the supposedly profound differences of ‘ race’, which
were said to separate all Bahutu from all Batutsi.
As Randrianja (1996 : 39) notes, ‘ the deepening of Africa’s economic
crisis tends to encourage a sort of cultural fundamentalism, comparable
to other religious fundamentalisms’. Rwanda has been no exception. It
was argued that for Bahutu to be safe, all Batutsis had to be removed
from society, amounting to a form of political and ethnic fun-
damentalism. This reduced all social conflicts to a two-dimensional
power struggle between two races (largely ignoring both Batwa and
Bazungu). Although still expressed mainly in a covert fashion, by the
early 1990s, a ‘final war’ between Tutsi and Hutu was being presented
to Rwandans and to foreign observers as more or less inevitable. Such
extremely intolerant political discourses were hardened further in
response to pressures to democratise, and the regime, which was
already economically beleaguered, responded by going on the offensive.
Lemarchand’s (1992 : 98) warning that ‘ the movement towards
democracy may contain within itself the seeds of its own undoing’
seems prophetic in the case of Rwanda in the early 1990s. Under the
terms of the Arusha Accords, a transitional government was due to
have been installed in Rwanda on 8 April, the day after the genocide
started. The UN mission installed in the country was due to leave on
5 April, the day before President Habyarimana’s assassination. It does
seem that the genocide was very carefully timed.
blaming the victims
Any attempt to defend the indefensible requires a demonstration of the
unreasonableness of the enemy, or some kind of evidence that the other
side’s evil designs justify a decision to pre-emptively harm them first. In
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Norman Cohn’s (1980) words, such myths about the enemy can
ultimately come to act as a ‘warrant for genocide’. ‘For injustice to be
acceptable evidently it must resemble justice ’ (Moore 1978 : 55). Even
the most fundamentalist and exclusionary movements claim to be
acting in self-defence. This explains why, so often, ‘ the party which
seeks to take power by instituting and legalising exclusion, expulsion,
segregation and [even] extermination, claims to be a victim itself ’
(Guillaumin 1990 : 9). The Rwandan political elite used the supposed
genocidal schemes of the enemy to transform an unpopular but
relatively successful group into scapegoats. On Rwandan Batutsis ’
heads were heaped all the evils of the colonial era, and all the problems
of the years since independence, including the economic and political
crises of the 1980s and 1990s. The supposed evil intentions and
revanchist designs of the Batutsi enemy, both within and outside
Rwanda, were seen as the reason the country was not flourishing.
Under increasing pressure, the akazu elite and their political allies in
Rwanda revived and elaborated a conspiracy theory known as the
Bahima conspiracy. As early as the 1970s, it had been claimed that
Burundian Batutsi had elaborated a plan, known as the Simbina-
niye}Micombero plot, to kill off enough Hutu to ensure a Batutsi
electoral majority (Lemarchand 1996 : 27–8). Reminiscent of the
fabricated Protocols of the Elders of Zion during the early twentieth
century, the Bahima conspiracy myth lent a spurious justification to
plans for genocide of the Batutsi. It was claimed that Bahutu would be
slaughtered, or at least recolonised by the Batutsi, unless drastic action
was taken to make such an outcome impossible (Chre! tien 1995 :
141–208 ; Thibon 1995). The enemy was accused of plotting genocide
themselves ; wholesale slaughter of all Bahutu was said to be on the
cards, unless some drastic preventative measures were taken be-
forehand. Just as the Nazis had done in Germany before the war,
extremists in Rwanda ‘started with the fiction of a conspiracy and
modelled themselves, more or less consciously, after it ’ (Cohn 1980 :
193).
Since the entire Hamitic or Bahima race was seen as being in
cahoots, it did not matter to the Rwandan regime that there was no
significant evidence for the existence of such a plot. The peaceful,
humble and hard-working Bantu race, of which the Bahutu were the
proud representatives, had to be defended from the evil designs of the
Batutsi minority. This scenario was very effective in removing
responsibility from the perpetrators of genocide, and placing re-
sponsibility for killings onto the victims, a process that can be described
as victim blaming. In other words, this was scapegoating using a
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fictitious plot as a justificatory device. Genocide plans had nothing to
do with ‘ethnic conflict’ ; as Peter Uvin (1997 : 112) puts it, ‘anti-Tutsi
prejudice was a construct of Hutu people [or some Hutu people] and
not the objective result of Tutsi behaviour’ (see also Destexhe 1995 :
43).
With the opening up of the press, articles and satirical pieces started
to emerge which lent credence to the idea of a Bahima}Tutsi plot to
dominate the entire East and Central African region. The birth of the
Rwandan nation was equated with the revolutionary overthrow of the
monarchy in 1959, and all Batutsi were depicted as monarchist
revanchists desperate to reverse any gains of the Revolution, and return
Hutu people to their subservient role of the past. It was believed that
the Tutsi elite were about to fulfil their long-cherished ambition to once
again conquer and subjugate the indigenous people of Rwanda, the
innocent Bahutu (Chre! tien 1995 : 142, 164–7). This recolonisation
would mean the restoration of slavery, and a return to the
unquestionable superiority of the Batutsi overlords over the Bahutu
majority; in short, a return to the pre-revolutionary past. In this
allegorical account of events, the RPF ceased to be a nationalist
military force based on Rwandan exiles, with a socialist political
orientation. Instead, it was depicted as a royalist army of pastoralist
raiders, intent on restoring feudalism across the entire Great Lakes
region (Chre! tien 1995 : 253).
All Tutsi were regarded as objective allies of the RPF, on the grounds
that they stood to gain if the Bahima conspiracy succeeded. Thus, so
long as all Bahutu acknowledged the existence of the Bahima
conspiracy, the Batutsi were conveniently converted into enemies of the
Rwandan state and its ethnic majority. Opposition politicians and
others who spoke up against the ruling Rwandan regime were
implicitly part of the Bahima conspiracy, and were a danger to their
fellow countrymen and women. According to such false logic, these
people were either insane or enemies of Rwandan independence; in
either case they were equated with the RPF.
Sexual competition emerges once again as an interesting under-
current in such victim blaming strategies. There are unmistakable
parallels with the sexual obsession of many brands of religious and
racialist fundamentalism, not least with Hitler’s own obsession with the
sexual capacities and appetites of Jewish men and women (Van der
Meeren 1996 : 256). The fall from grace in the pre-Tutsi Garden of
Eden was explained in terms of seduction, both economic and sexual.
The ‘Hutu desire to own cattle ’ was the ‘ fundamental reason for their
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subjugation’, as was the desire to marry Batutsi women (Louis 1963 :
110 ; also Maquet 1961 ; Newbury 1988 ; Lemarchand 1996 : 6). In
supremacist propaganda, Batutsis are accused of having bought the
Hutu’s soul, and the majority population is urged to reject contact with
the Batutsi and avoid economic, political or sexual dependence on
them.
A key document in the Bahima conspiracy theory is the ‘Ten
Commandments of the Hutu’, first published in the Rwandan Hutu
supremacist magazine, Kangura, in 1990 (No. 6, December). Sexual
politics were one of the main ingredients in this race hate tract. The first
three of the ten commandments proscribed sexual relations between the
two ‘races ’ and openly accused Batutsi of using ‘ their ’ women to
enslave elite Bahutu men. These ‘wives ’ were Hamitic Eves in the
Bantu garden of Eden, and it became the duty of every Bahutu woman
to rescue her husband, brothers and sons from such women’s clutches.
The majority was called on to cut off all business ties with the minority,
an uncomfortable request considering that President Habyarimana
himself had previously enjoyed close and comfortable business ties with
wealthy Batutsi Rwandans. Another of the ten commandments
required ‘Bahutu to stop feeling any pity for Batutsi’ ; it advised them
to seek support from all ‘ fellow Bantu’ people in the Great Lakes region
for their racial emancipation. According to the final commandment,
anyone who did not agree with all the preceding commandments
should automatically be regarded as a traitor.
A parallel document is the parallel ‘17 Rules of the Tutsi ’, again
published by Kangura, this time in 1993 (Guichaoua 1995 : 567–9). This
is a hate tract of dubious origin, but has been presented by some
reputable scholars as evidence of a ‘Bahima plot ’ in the Great Lakes
region (Lemarchand 1996 :xvii). On closer inspection, it appears to be
a rather opaque hoax. Not only does it call on Tutsi to ‘ identify all
Hutu living nearby’, an impossible task in most areas where Bahutu
outnumber Batutsi by ten to one. There are also references in this
document to ‘Uganda’ as the Batutsi homeland. This is rather suspect,
given that the document was said to originate in Burundi, where
Batutsi have few connections or affinities with Uganda. Bahutu
supremacists, on the other hand, did see Uganda as the source of the
revanchist RPF. Another rule advises all Tutsi to stay where they are
and fight to the death. This sounds less like a rule (for which
organisation would suggest to its members that they were likely to die?)
than like a piece of wishful thinking by ‘Hutu power’ propagandists.
The document also suggests that Tutsi should kill all Bahutu children,
266 helen m . hintjens
something the rules would not mention if they were genuine. Indeed,
the idea of killing children was first raised by Leon Mugesera in his
famous ‘Nyaborongo River’ speech of 1992 (referred to earlier in this
article), when he pointed out that many of the fighters of the RPF had
left Rwanda in the 1960s as small children. Had they been killed in
1959–62, he argued, they could not have returned to fight again
(Article 19 1996 : 39–40). All this suggests that the document is a
forgery, and may well have been fabricated in order to feed the Bahima
conspiracy myth.
According to several sources, fictitious reports were common, both
on the radio and in the press. One example was a Rwandan radio
report that a human rights organisation based in Nairobi had
discovered evidence of an RPF plot to kill prominent Hutu politicians
and carry out genocide of all Rwandan Bahutu. The available evidence
suggests that this story, and the human rights organisation itself, were
complete fabrications (Article 19 1996 ; Destexhe 1995). Even so,
another prominent Rwanda scholar, Filip Reyntjens (1995 : 62), gives
this ‘news’ item credence, and claims that the RPF did indeed plan to
kill off Bahutu intellectuals once they took over state power. Mamdani’s
warning concerning the extreme care that needs to be taken in the
Rwandan case, with the use of this kind of ‘evidence’, is here worth
remembering.
The Rwandan regime and its supporters made use of some
sophisticated techniques of disinformation, which seem to have been
learned from a close examination of wartime propaganda elsewhere.
Fictitious bombings of Kigali were staged and reported (EIU 1994 : 22 ;
Mackintosh 1996 : 45 ; Article 19 1996 : 26). Another uncanny example
of this was a story reportedly relayed on Radio Mille Collines during
the first month of the genocide, and for which no evidence was ever
found. This was an almost exact repeat of a partisan story used in
Poland. In this account, a young woman, dressed in white, finds herself
alive in a mass open grave, dug by her and her family who have been
shot by the RPF (originally by the Allies), and fallen into the pit on top
of her. She somehow manages to climb out of the grave, and so shocks
the soldiers still gathered around that they do not kill her, but instead
ask her to cook for them. Eventually she manages to escape while they
are eating and lives to tell the tale (Article 19 1996 : 48). It sounds like
a central European fairy tale, and was repeated almost word for word
in Rwanda during the genocide. This kind of borrowing of propaganda
tales needs further investigation, and is an interesting aspect of the
preparation and execution of genocide in Rwanda.
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Popular music also became a vehicle for ridiculing Bahutus who did
not fall in line with Hutu power extremists, or did not sufficiently hate
Batutsis. From time to time, government and militia forces staged fake
attacks on Kigali in order create panic among civilians and rally extra
support for the militias and the extremist Hutu power party, the CDR
(Coalition pour la De! fense de la Re!publique) (Uvin 1997 : 110–11).
Such deliberate and calculated disinformation helped create the right
atmosphere for mass killings, both in the run-up to the 1994 genocide,
and during the genocide itself.
Such propaganda also had the desired effect of shifting the blame for
every Rwandan problem onto the RPF and the Rwandan Batutsi,
presumed to be its allies. Like other minorities transformed into
scapegoats, Rwandan Batutsi came to be held responsible not only for
economic recession and political unrest, but even for their own
victimisation. The RPF enemy were reputed to behave in ways that
placed them outside the norm of humanity; they were depicted as
depraved beasts, capable of atrocities of all kinds including cannibalism,
rape and other forms of deviance (Chre! tien 1995, for cartoons ;
Oplinger 1990 : 257–8 ; Storr 1991 : 124, 137). They were even
attributed magical and demonic qualities. In a manner strikingly
reminiscent of Nazi images of Jewish people, the Hutu ‘power’ press
dehumanised Rwandans of Tutsi origin to such an extent that they
became hostages to the RPF. In the same way, the Jews had been
regarded as victims of a hidden war with the international Jewish
conspiracy. As had been the case in Nazi Germany, anyone expressing
any sympathy with Batutsi was automatically branded a public enemy
(Oplinger 1990 : 223 ; Cohn 1980 : 212).
an open secret
In the run-up to April 1994, although plans for genocide were openly
broadcast and written about in the media, a deceptive aura of
normality was maintained. The ruling party, the MRND, had changed
its initials only slightly in response to the democratisation of political
life – from Mouvement Re! volutionnaire Nationale pour le De! velopp-
ement to MRND(D), adding et la DeUmocratie. The militias together
with the army organised much of the killing during the genocide. They
grew rapidly from 1991 onwards, starting off innocuously enough as
local football clubs for street children, and patriotic associations for
unemployed youth to carry out public works (Reyntjens 1995 : 57–8).
Many militias wore authentic Afro-print uniforms, owing much to the
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authenticiteU of Mobutu’s Zaı$ re (Chre! tien 1995 : 237). The young men in
these militias were trained in fighting techniques, which glamorised
violence and involved much chanting, somewhat reminiscent of Winnie
Mandela’s fictitious football club in Soweto. The largest of these militia
groups was the interahamwe, which literally translated means ‘ those who
help one another’ (and not, as some studies suggest, ‘we attack
together’) (Destexhe 1995 : 29 ; Manikas & Kumar 1996 : 68 ; Human
Rights Watch 1994 : 2). Until preparation for genocide, interahamwe
were rural self-help work groups, which operated at the level of local
communes. They were much praised by donors and seen as essential to
the success of Rwanda’s development model (Waller 1996 : 37).
Appearances of continuity could be deceptive, and familiar, comfort-
able terms were often used euphemistically to disguise the serious intent
of those preparing for genocide.
When the radio station RTLM (Radio-Te! le! vision Mille Collines)
first went on the air, it appeared a jokey and popular station,
broadcasting in Kinyarwanda instead of French, more ‘ street wise ’
than official Rwandan radio and close to its listeners. It was reported
that the RPF troops also preferred to listen to it rather than to the
official RPF radio (Article 19 1996 : 86). Yet RTLM seemed to know
what was coming, and reported that ‘a little something’ was planned
for early April. The role of this radio station in urging on the killings,
broadcasting names of Tutsi and opposition targets, and reporting the
whereabouts of those hiding from militias during the genocide, is now
well documented. The killing squads (interahamwe) were thus often able
to discover people who were hidden with relatives or neighbours,
through reports on the radio (Article 19 1996 : 101).
Like many people who have to live with hierarchy, Rwandans are
expert at euphemistic expressions designed both to convey, and to
disguise, their true intention. Dissimulation was a vital element of
genocide propaganda, and had the power ‘ to lay asleep opposition; to
surprise ; to reserve to a man’s self a fair retreat ’ (Zagorin 1990 : 256).
According to Clapham (1998 : 209), ‘groups who sought a genocidal
solution’ used the period of the Arusha negotiations to prepare for the
genocide, and had no intention of agreeing with the terms of any
settlement. Ambiguity was deliberately cultivated during preparation
for the genocide, and even during its implementation. Thus the
genocide was referred to as a big job, akazi gakomeye, or special work
umuganda ; killing was also repeatedly referred to as tree felling. Prunier
(1995 : 138, 142) reports that ‘chopping up men was ‘‘bush clearing’’
and slaughtering women and children was ‘‘pulling out the roots of the
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bad weeds ’’ ’. The same kind of powerful metaphorical and euphemistic
language had also been used in Rwanda in 1959, and during periodic
massacres of Bahutu in neighbouring Burundi. The references to
agricultural labour were therefore not new. Such imagery had the
advantage of being open to double meanings (Lemarchand 1996 :
125–6). On the one hand, being coded, such messages served to disguise
the horror of what was planned; on the other hand, those addressed
were reminded of their duty to obediently take part in this ‘ special
shared work’.
Under Habyarimana’s regime, Rwandans’ sense of orderly discipline
was inculcated through weekly umuganda (collective work) sessions,
involving periods of ‘animation’, including dance, praise for the regime
and its leaders, and a great deal of collective chanting and clapping.
These rituals were repeated in more macabre mode to prepare ordinary
people and militias for the job of killing. Eventual compliance was
obtained from many of those initially opposed to the killings through
propaganda leaflets, and hate speech on the radio and in villages.
Those who killed were also promised rewards, ranging from bottles of
beer to the property of the dead (Article 19 1996 : 33 ; Prunier 1995 :
137–8 ; African Rights 1996).
Throughout the Second Republic, the strict requirement to obey
orders had been applied to development activities at the level of each
local community, and within each ‘cell ’ of ten households. From April
1994, the same requirement was applied with similar thoroughness to
achieve a different aim: the rapid elimination of all Batutsi, part-Tutsi
and all those who supported them, from Rwanda’s body politic.
Collective works, such as terracing, wood felling, tree planting, road
mending and construction work, had all been based on voluntary
labour during the First and Second Republics (Waller 1996 : 19–20).
The state now required ordinary (Bahutu) citizens to put selfish
concerns aside once again, and assist in getting rid once and for all of
the Batutsi enemy and its allies. The FAR and militias were soon so
busy killing unarmed civilians that by June the RPF was able to
overrun the country.
During the genocide itself, orders to kill were issued from the top and
passed down; those who refused to kill were almost always killed
themselves. The result was the almost total destruction of social bonds
and relations of trust, and a situation where ‘pupils were killed by their
teachers, shop owners by their customers, neighbour killed neighbour
and husbands killed wives in order to save them from a more terrible
death’ (Destexhe 1995 : 31). Even young schoolchildren were used to
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help identify the enemy and point them out (African Rights 1996).
Almost no-one escaped the killers, who could include close relatives and
the extended family, as well as neighbours, local officials, soldiers and
militia members. Many victims of the genocide appeared to be taken
by surprise, and were killed while seeking shelter in churches, mayors’
offices and schools. Because the planning of genocide was shrouded in
an ‘ illusion of normality ’ (Friedlander 1997 : 60–1), many Batutsi
refused to believe that their Bahutu neighbours and the armed forces
would one day come to kill them simply because they were Batutsi.
Rumours of a forthcoming ‘apocalypse’ were frequent prior to 1994,
and preparations by militias were fairly obvious. Yet such dangers may
have seemed unbelievable to ordinary Rwandan Batutsi, who were
probably more concerned with daily survival than with questions of
political ideology. The international community also ignored some
early warnings. Grave concerns had been expressed both by the
International Federation for Human Rights, and by the UN Special
Rapporteur for Rwanda, Degni Segui, prior to the genocide. In
January 1994 even General Dallaire, the commander of the UN force
in Rwanda, issued a warning (FIDH 1993 : 4 ; Republic of Rwanda
1995 : 31–2 ; Reyntjens 1995 : 59 ; Mackintosh 1996 : 147–8). Unin-
tentionally, there may have been so many warnings that they became
rumours, tending to disarm the intended victims of the genocide rather
than prepare them for self-defence; perhaps the Batutsi had already
heard the little boy cry ‘wolf ’ so many times that they no longer
listened. By April 1994 it was too late, and the wolf of genocide had
started to attack its victims in earnest (Reyntjens calls it ‘machinery’,
1996 : 248).
implementing genocide : obedience and terror
The counterpart of Rwandans’ much-noted obedience to authority has
been what Prunier (1995 : 3) terms the ‘almost monstrous degree of
social control ’ of the Rwandan state over almost every aspect of
people’s lives. Prior to the genocide, a form of ‘chillingly purposeful
bureaucratic control ’ was exercised over the population by gove-
rnmental authorities (Oplinger 1990 : 260). Population movements
had been minutely controlled since the late 1980s, and under the state
of emergency declared in November 1990, permission was needed for
anyone to move out of their commune into another area, and curfews
were in operation. For decades, peasants had been told exactly when
and what to farm, and could be fined if they did not comply with such
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instructions. They were also expected to carry out free labour one day
a week (Newbury 1992).
Social conformism has sometimes been explained as a legacy of
traditional pre-European Rwandan society, where respect for hierarchy
was already firmly entrenched. Internalised inegalitarian notions,
requiring constant ‘ self-surveillance’ by subordinate individuals, are
also seen as making externalised violence in the society largely
unnecessary (Thibon 1995). In Rwanda, respect for authority and the
fear of stepping out of line was a marked feature of the post-
independence status quo, and was incorporated into the planning and
design of community-level developmental activities. That is not to say
that there was no room for manoeuvre ‘ from below’ (Pottier 1996). But
a sense of discipline and self-sacrifice among the populace, and the
honesty and dedication of most state officials, was none the less widely
commented on and much admired by outside observers during the
1980s (Newbury 1992).
Reyntjens (1996 : 244–5) saw this tendency for obedient compliance
as facilitating the ruthless efficiency of genocide in 1994. Since ‘ the
state is present everywhere and every Rwandan is administered…
Orders travel fast and well from top to bottom’. The result was a highly
efficient machinery of government that enabled the implementation of
a complex genocide plan in a short time span, using highly effective
propaganda techniques and with a high degree of military pre-
paredness. Deference to authority is certainly not a pathology of
particular peoples, but it does have some material basis in the
extremely hierarchical social structure which has characterised
Rwanda for centuries. Some have suggested that a high degree of social
control may be needed because of the high population density and the
need to maintain close social relations within a confined area (Waller
1996 : 18 ; Prunier 1995 : 3–4). Population density in Rwanda is
exceptionally high for Africa, at about 208 people per square kilometre,
and between 400 and 800 for arable land, depending on the district
(Economist Pocket Africa 1995 : 20).
When the orders finally came to kill all Batutsi in Rwanda, and those
partly Hutu and with mixed relatives, most of those called on complied,
sometimes with enthusiasm (Uvin 1997 : 112). Of the few heroes who
resisted, most did not live to tell the tale (Gourevitch 1997 : 44–51). In
a series of well-known experiments, psychologist Stanley Milgram
(1974) suggested that respect for authority could lead ordinary people
to inflict pain and even kill others without feeling responsibility for
their actions (see also Miller 1986 : 179–81). During wartime, as in this
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genocide, it can be that for most people ‘government authority
overrides the usual prohibitions about killing one’s fellow men’ (Storr
1991 : 105). As Erich Fromm (1984 : 6) puts it, ‘my obedience makes
me part of the power I worship…I can make no error, since it decides
for me’. Even those who masterminded the genocide in Rwanda
claimed to be acting in the collective self-defence of the majority (cf.
Cohn 1980 : 25). Initially it proved quite difficult to force people to kill
their Batutsi neighbours and family, but threats of violence against
those unwilling to kill usually ensured that they did as they were told
(African Rights 1996).
Killing started in earnest once international observers (except a
small contingent of UNAMIR), and European journalists, busi-
nessmen, clergy, diplomats and aid workers had left Rwanda. Local
officials were obliged to comply with orders to kill Batutsi, and after 20
April no area was left untouched. When the prefect of the southern
district of Butare refused to order Bahutu in his area to kill Batutsi, he
was himself killed, and militias from the north took over the area
(Prunier 1995 : 261 ; Article 19 1996 : 57). This put an end to almost two
weeks of local resistance to the genocide. Killers were urged on day and
night : ‘by 5 May, the country must be completely cleansed of Tutsis ’,
said Radio Libre Mille Collines (Destexhe 1995 : 32). RTLM
repeatedly referred to the Simusiga, or hurricane, portraying the
genocide as a quasi-natural event which it was futile to resist (Article
19 1996 : 101).
During the genocide itself, physical features such as ‘a long nose,
long fingers or height (were) considered a sufficient basis for a sentence
of death’ (African Rights 1996 : 45). The blurred distinction between
the two ‘ethnic groups ’ in terms of appearance, and their overlapping
physical characteristics, meant that looks could not be taken as a
reliable indicator of the individual’s official ethnic identity (Clapham
1998 : 197). Identity cards were therefore examined at all checkpoints
set up throughout the country during the genocide. Mixed Hutu–Tutsi
babies and children were generally killed to prevent them seeking
revenge for their parents’ death once fully grown, and Bahutu who had
married Batutsi partners were sometimes also killed to punish them for
marrying the enemy, even if it had been decades earlier. Many Bahutu
who had the misfortune to ‘ look Tutsi ’ were killed on the basis of
appearance alone, and some Batutsi who ‘ looked Hutu’ had forged ID
cards and managed to escape death (Mackintosh 1996 : 38). Even if
ethnic identities had been removed from identity cards, as had been
demanded some years earlier by observers, physical appearance and
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people’s long memories, as well as municipal records, could have been
used to help identify all those who had been targeted for extermination.
indifference and denial
Of late, there has been much exposure in the media of the failure of the
United Nations and the international community to take action to
prevent killings once the genocide started (The Guardian 7 December
1998). In April and May 1994, the international community, through
the United Nations, was unable and unwilling to prevent a
continuation of what was soon understood to be genocide. The United
States in particular was preoccupied by its own domestic concerns and
initially did not seem to give much thought to the nature of the killings,
being wary of any intervention that would embroil it in something even
more complex than Somalia. France simply did what it could to
prevent English-speaking Africans from coming to power in Rwanda.
An increased UNAMIR contingent of 5,500 troops was agreed to in
May, but, for administrative reasons, was never sent. France
maintained its ties with the Rwandan armed forces and militias even
after the killings started. French material interests included arms sales,
and rewards for private companies and ‘ loyal ’ Africans (The Economist
25 April 1998). On the other hand, President Habyarimana also knew
how to play the Anglo-Saxon peril card for all it was worth, and was
assisted by the fact that many RPF forces spoke not French but English
(Huliaras 1998 ; Prunier 1995 : 103). France was able to persuade other
European countries to stay relatively quiet in the run-up to genocide.
There was much bluster about sovereignty, and the violence was
explained as a civil war, due to the RPF invasion of the country.
Only a few hundred soldiers, mainly from Senegal and Bangladesh,
stayed in Rwanda after mid-April, unable to help and forced to watch
while the first genocide in Africa’s post-independence history unfolded
in front of their eyes (Doyle 1994 : 99–103). The only other intervention
was when France set up Operation Turquoise, a so-called ‘ safe zone’
in the south-west of Rwanda, at best an ambiguous intervention
(Clapham 1998 : 207). There was also some support from the ailing
dictators of Zaire, Kenya and Togo. As one observer commented
(Jones 1995 : 248), ‘ there was no armed humanitarian intervention in
Rwanda specifically intended to deal with the perpetration of the
genocide. There were…putatively humanitarian interventions prior to
the genocide (to help resolve the civil war) and after it (to punish its
perpetrators). ’
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One reason there was so little international response to advance
warnings of genocide was because of international indifference and
ignorance about the reality of Rwanda’s situation. Those who planned
the genocide did so meticulously, indeed coldly, and lambasted the
outside world with the received image of the killings as ‘ tribal ’. They
were ‘clear thinking, determined criminals ’, rather than raving fanatics
(Destexhe 1995 : 12). The phenomenon of ‘massacres by remote
control ’ characterised the genocide period itself, and as Erich Fromm
(1973 : 404) reminds us with reference to the Nazi genocide, ‘Hitler did
not get involved…He was never present at a murder or an execution. ’
The architects of the genocide had their intellectuals too, who had read
their history books, and were able to present superficially plausible
proof that this was indeed an ‘ inter-ethnic’ or ‘ tribal ’ conflict, deeply
rooted in the history of the Great Lakes region. For the West, it was
almost as if genocide was not really happening, only a simulacrum on
television.
Withholding information from outsiders, including reporters, aca-
demics and other naive foreigners, is often seen as justified, particularly
in situations ridden with internal conflicts. In Rwanda, this is known
as amalenga (Reyntjens 1995 : 7). Accordingly, the truth of genocide
plans was simply denied, and messages were employed which were
deliberately ambiguous, being understood by supporters and those ‘ in
the know’, but confusingly vague to others. ‘To those who have no
right to know one could adapt one’s speech by using language that they
would misunderstand through ignorance’ (Zagorin 1990 : 251). The
methods used by architects of the Rwanda genocide were reminiscent
of those used by ‘negationists ’ of the Holocaust. ‘Verbally attack the
victims, deny – even in the face of the clearest evidence – that any
physical violence is taking place or has taken place’ (Prunier 1995 :
241). The Batutsi were even said to be committing collective suicide.
Such techniques were as much for international opinion as for the
Rwandan population.
After killing the liberal Bahutu Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyi-
mana and other leading opposition figures on 7 April, the interim
government broadcast its ‘ regret ’ at what it called the tragic killings of
these leading politicians (Article 19 1996 : 137–8 ; Reyntjens 1995 : 75).
The akazu seemed to be counting on this form of denial being accepted,
presuming, quite realistically, a high level of media ignorance about
Rwanda, particularly in the anglophone world. The akazu was assisted
in this by an apparent loss of will on the part of the international
community and the UN Security Council. The French were allowed to
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present their ‘Zone of Peace’ to the UN as a humanitarian military
intervention, in spite of their record of military assistance to militias
and to the Rwandan army prior to May 1994.
Whereas much of the international media (especially in Britain and
the United States) had started by treating reports of killings as another
example of ‘ tribal ’ massacres in Africa, resulting from mutual ethnic
hatreds, it soon became apparent that there was rapid, efficient and
systematic killing of unarmed civilians. Photographs soon started to
emerge of mass graves, of piles of dead left to rot in churches, of bloated
corpses floating down the Nyaborongo River, dead bodies strewn by
roadsides, not buried and not even covered up. The genocide was soon
exposed as fact, and the planned and one-sided nature of the killings lay
as exposed as the bodies of the dead. Most journalists and commentators
started to understand that there had been ‘a well-planned campaign of
politically and materially motivated slaughter ’, which had nothing to
do with received stereotypical images of inter-ethnic fighting in Africa,
in the Balkans or elsewhere (Keane 1996 : 30). By May, reports were
filtering through into some newspapers in France, the UK and US that
gave evidence of genocide and contradicted initial reports of civil war
and anarchy. By the end of June, a whole swathe of Rwanda’s civilian
population, including men, women, children, foetuses (and generations
to come), had been wiped out.
The UN Security Council set up an International Tribunal for
Crimes against Humanity in November 1994, and the fact of genocide
was at last officially recognised. Yet throughout this period, US
government employees were reportedly ordered to refrain from using
the term ‘genocide’ in any official pronouncements on Rwanda
(Article 19 1996 : 116). Denial is resistant to evidence, and as in
Germany during the Nazi era, such denial started before the genocide
was over, and even before it began, and has continued now it is (more
or less) over. There are still references to the ‘civil war’ of 1994 by those
who find it hard to admit the collective responsibility of the former
regime and its supporters for organising the killings on a selective basis
(see Gourevitch 1997).
Had the genocide of 1994 been passed off as ‘ just another African
tribal bloodletting’, it would have had profound effects for the study of
political change and democratisation in the continent. A fatalism about
African politics, already very fashionable in Western European and US
military and political circles, would have been reinforced with
potentially disastrous consequences for democratisation policies in the
continent. There is still a sense of disbelief at the enormity of the
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killings : as many as 1 million people dead in 100 days. A sense of
weariness is obvious among policy makers and journalists, as well as
academics, contemplating the events of 1994 and the repercussions
since. Some hope it can all be explained in fairly simple terms, without
controversy or counter-accusation or complex trials in which some are
found guilty and others accuse. Unfortunately this is not possible. The
indifference of the international community raised all kinds of ethical
and practical problems, particularly given the willingness to skirt
round the issue of genocide with the government of Rwanda. As Fergal
Keane (1996 : 30) has put it : ‘genocidal killing in Africa diminishes all
of us ’. It diminished Rwandans’ sense of themselves, since ultimately
some Rwandans carried out and planned selective killings on a huge
scale (Mamdani 1996 : 19–23).
explaining rwanda through burundi
It is quite artificial to consider Bahutu identity without considering
Batutsi (and Batwa) identity in tandem. Similarly, it is somewhat
artificial to study post-colonial events in Rwanda and Burundi as if
they took place in isolation from each other. Only by extending the
scope of this article beyond the confines of Rwanda can we hope to
have an adequate explanation of how the genocide of 1994 could have
come about, and how it could been conceived of in the first place.
There are very significant historical and contemporary interconnec-
tions and mutual responses in terms of Bahutu–Batutsi inter-group
relations. The two neighbouring inter-lacustrine states, roughly the size
of Holland and Belgium, have been as intertwined as ‘Siamese twins ’
since at least the start of Belgian trusteeship after World War I. From
1962, when both Rwanda and Burundi became independent, each
country’s domestic politics has coloured perceptions of sociopolitical
conflict in its neighbour (Anacleti 1996 : 310). Complex relations of
inter-dependent reaction and counter-reaction have emerged, and
these have contributed to the crystallisation of notions of separate,
rather than interdependent, Bahutu and Batutsi identities, a process
started during the colonial era.
From 1960 until 1990 or so, Rwanda and Burundi resembled an
‘ inverted mirror image’ of each other ; the Rwandan state was
controlled by Bahutu elites, and Burundi was controlled by Batutsi
elites. The institutions of each state were administered in such a way as
to benefit one social group (or at least its dominant minority). The
perceived enemy social group was tightly controlled and even
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persecuted. The persecution of Bahutu in Burundi was thus aggravated
by, and in turn used to justify, the persecution of the Batutsi in
Rwanda. Such retaliation was also fuelled by refugee movements across
the Rwanda–Burundi border, and by lurid tales told by those who fled.
When Rwanda had became independent, Batutsi in both Rwanda and
Burundi feared a Belgian plot to eliminate them. Bahutu politicians,
meanwhile, feared constant cross-border attacks from the disaffected
Batutsi exiles. In Burundi, each repression of Batutsi in Rwanda
became the pretext for another round of killing of educated Burundian
Bahutu. The status quo in Burundi in particular came to be seen as
increasingly fragile and in need of defence from its enemies, especially
the educated Bahutu. Any adequate account of the 1994 genocide in
Rwanda needs to account for the logic of such attacks and counter-
attacks, which appeared to become progressively more ruthless over the
years up to 1994.
The key event of Burundian politics used to justify the genocide in
Rwanda was the killing of the first popularly elected Bahutu president,
Melchior Ndadaye, in October 1993, just four months after his election.
This assassination was carried out by the army, and reinforced claims
that power sharing between Bahutu and Batutsi was impossible ; there
could be no prospect of trust because Batutsi would not tolerate Bahutu
rule (Watson 1994 : 26–31). The fact that Bahutu rule had been the
norm in Rwanda since independence was conveniently forgotten and
ignored. Certainly, even in the 1990s, the Batutsi regime in Burundi felt
unable to accept Bahutu leaders and membership in the army. This
had more to do with fears of domination by a Bahutu majority,
Rwandan-style, than with pan-Batutsi plans to eliminate Hutu, as the
extremists in Rwanda claimed. The killing of Ndadaye marked the
start of a series of fatal events and international blunders that resulted
in the genocide. It also added to the already rich mythology being
developed in order to justify a violent final solution to the problems of
Bahutu–Batutsi coexistence in Rwanda in particular, and more
generally in the Great Lakes region.
A major expression of the parallel structures was the army; in
Burundi the army was entirely controlled by Batutsi, and in Rwanda
prior to 1994, Bahutu dominated the military structure almost as
completely (The Economist 6 July 1996, 19 October 1996). The same
was true of the administration and the whole public sector. Educated
Bahutu in Burundi were regularly massacred and terrorised, and
excluded from state institutions. Rwandan Batutsi were allowed to
continue operating in the private sector, but were subject to strict
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quotas once they entered the public sector. Batusti domination of state
institutions in Burundi was seen as a legitimation of the quota system
in Rwanda (The Economist 27 August 1994 ; Lemarchand 1970). In
both cases exclusive ‘ownership’ of state institutions was based on class
as well as on identity labels. Inter-Tutsi elite competition for control of
the state in Burundi was matched by inter-Hutu elite competition for
the state in Rwanda, but as economic recession and political crisis bit
deeper, all conflicts came to be seen as ethnic or ‘racial ’ conflicts.
After the killings of 1959 and the Revolution in Rwanda, Batutsi
refugees moved into Northern Burundi. They remained among the
most reactionary of the Batutsi in the Great Lakes region, in marked
contrast, for example, to refugees who fled to Uganda and later joined
forces with the NRM (National Resistance Movement) of Yoweri
Museveni. Refugees who remained in Burundi were more likely to
continue dreaming of the past, and some had hopes of restoring the
Batutsi kingships in the region. The coming of more refugees imported
a harder notion of Bahutu–Batutsi relations into Burundi ; for the first
time such relations were portrayed as essentially conflictual rather than
consensual or interdependent. There were localised mass killings of
Burundian Bahutu in 1972, 1988, and 1993. In 1993 both Batutsi and
Bahutu were killed after the murder of President Ndadaye (Lemar-
chand 1996). Batwa were reportedly ordered by Batutsi to carry out
killings of Bahutu (Reyntjens 1995 : 55). More than 400,000 people fled
to Rwanda, and up to 300,000 more to neighbouring countries. ‘Ethnic
cleansing’ of Bujumbura began early in 1994. All this set the scene for
the genocide plan of the Rwandan regime to be implemented
(Lemarchand 1996 : 96–100, 122).
By an unhappy coincidence, the killing of Ndadaye coincided with
the RPF’s second invasion of Rwanda, giving apparent plausibility to
the notion of a Bahima (pan-Tutsi) conspiracy to reconquer the entire
region, and reimpose the old feudal order in Rwanda. Conspiracy
theories continued after the genocide, and became internationalised;
not only Pierre Buyoya in Burundi, but also Yoweri Museveni in
Uganda and other ‘progressive ’ leaders in the Horn of Africa, were
now said to be part of a ‘Hamitic plot ’. Ethiopia, Eritrea and even the
newly-named Democratic Republic of the Congo, were included in this
new conspiracy theory. The reversal of the situation in the former Zaire
is interesting in this regard. Ominously, the notion of a pan-Hamite
brotherhood bent on dominance of the honest Bantu peoples of Africa
has become part of a new racialised ideological language in central and
eastern Africa (The Observer 18 May 1997).
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Victimisation of Batutsi within Rwanda has consistently been
justified as avenging victimisation of Bahutu in neighbouring Burundi.
Yet neither country has been willing to openly go to war with the
other ; indeed their diplomatic relations have generally been fair. The
violence of the armed forces has been unleashed against the internal
enemy, instead of against a common enemy across the border. In
Burundi, the regular killings of Bahutu were also prompted by fears that
the Rwandan Revolution would spread south and bring the demo-
graphic majority into power in Burundi too (Lemarchand 1970). A
cycle of what might be described as pre-emptive, internalised retaliation
was thus established between the two neighbouring regimes, directed at
domestic populations but prompted by reactions to each other’s
national politics. This cycle accelerated the pace of killings by both
regimes during the 1990s and made genocide conceivable (Reyntjens
1995 : 62).
Since 1994, the simple mirror image of Rwanda and Burundi no
longer applies, and in some ways the two regimes now resemble each
other much more closely than at any time since independence.
However, in other ways they are very different in their goals and
strategies. Whereas the regime in Rwanda is officially opposed to ethnic
identification of groups of people and individuals, and has removed
ethnic labels from identity cards, the regime in Burundi has done little
but target Bahutu since 1994. Where there is the least threat of
genocide being conducted against Batutsi, there is the most suppression
and killing of Bahutu. Where the perpetrators of genocide want to
continue their job, the government of Rwanda seeks to promote some
measure of civil harmony, justice but also reconciliation (Republic of
Rwanda 1995). This is why Burundi has been the main focus of
regional peace-making efforts since 1994, not Rwanda. Nonetheless
killings by both governments continue. The fatal logic according to
which only killing today can prevent killing by the ‘other side’
tomorrow, thus remains unchallenged (Van der Meeren 1996 : 263–6).
In Burundi, where the Batutsi-dominated army has periodically
massacred the Bahutu population since independence, many thousands
of Batutsi were murdered for the first time after the assassination of
President Ndadaye in 1993. In Rwanda at the same time, as if in order
to justify these killings, the extremist RTLM spread the rumour that
Rwandan Batutsi danced in the streets at news of Ndadaye’s death
(Article 19 1996 : 90). There was no evidence of this, but it suited the
idea that ‘all Tutsi were alike ’, and that they disliked all Bahutu and
wished them dead.
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In part, genocide was possible in Rwanda in 1994 because of this
interpenetration of perceptions of relations between Batutsi and Bahutu
in Burundi and Rwanda. An aid worker reporting on how the effects
of the 1994 Rwanda genocide were felt in Burundi put it in stark terms:
‘A kind of terror is entering people’s minds, and moderates are
becoming extremists ’ (Watson 1994 : 31). Lemarchand went so far as
to warn that Burundi could be the next Rwanda in reverse. ‘From all
appearances, Burundi has reached yet another turning point in its
tortuous path to self-destruction…more and more Hutu will be
tempted to join the ranks of extremists…rabidly anti-Hutu newspapers
are circulating, some of which do not hesitate to publish lists of Hutu
politicians ’ (Lemarchand 1996 : xxii). There are some disturbing
parallels between the approach of the Buyoya regime in Burundi, and
the former akazu in Rwanda. Both consider themselves representative
of their entire stratum or social group, and yet face strong challenges
from within their own social group, as well as from the supposed
‘ethnic’ enemy. Both have proved prepared to sacrifice the interests of
almost the entire population in their efforts to stay in power.
After 1994 the situation in Burundi steadily deteriorated to the point
where the idea of a genocide in reverse ceased to be glib journalese. In
1996–97 the Burundian army rounded up hundreds of thousands of
Hutu into camps, and carried out raids into Tanzania in an effort to
isolate Bahutu militias and ‘finish them off’. Just as the RPF’s (non-
racial) notions of Rwandan nationalism were born in exile in Uganda,
so the Palipehutu}Parmehutu notions of Burundian and Rwandan
identity have been remoulded in the highly politically charged refugee
camps of Western Tanzania and Zaire."! Hatreds and fears have
continued to be transmitted indirectly from Rwanda to Burundi and
back again (Vassall-Adams 1994 ; Lemarchand 1996 : 103–4).
: : :
It should by now be clear that there can be no single, simple
explanation of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. A number of possible
causes, which need to be included in any satisfactory account of the
genocide, have none the less been identified. These include: the
colonial ideology of racial division; the economic and political crises of
the 1980s and early 1990s ; the previously very highly organised nature
of Rwandan society; and the fragile regional and class base of a
political faction determined to hold on to state power at any cost. Other
important contributing factors were the use of sophisticated propa-
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ganda techniques, and the escalatory cycle of violence within Rwanda
and Burundi. It has been argued that ethnic accounts or a ‘racial ’
explanation of the genocide are untenable. Of course, the politics of
ethnic identification was central to implementing genocide plans.
Ethnic conflict is usually presumed to be possible only when there is
some popular support for separate identities among the majority of the
populations concerned. This was not obvious in Rwanda, where ethnic
conflict had to be engineered. Logically, carefully planned and well-
organised plans to exterminate a group of people identified solely on
the basis of their supposed ethnic, or racial, identity cannot be the same
as ‘ethnic conflict’ ; the cause is political and not social. In many ways,
we are not much closer to identifying the origins of the political project
of genocide than at the start of the article ; it is clear that much more
in-depth research would be needed in Rwanda (and in Belgium and
France) than has been possible here. Clearly a government which was
supposed to ‘protect the people ’ ended up doing the opposite (Republic
of Rwanda 1995 : 13). The present government of Burundi can appear
to some to be in danger of a similar bias, although with less dramatic
consequences than in Rwanda in 1994.
A tiny but vocal minority of people seem keen to deny that the
Rwanda genocide took place at all. In some cases, they claim the RPF
itself was responsible, since it invaded Rwanda, and continues to
persecute the Rwandan Bahutu now. A conference organised by Africa
Direct in July 1997 was entitled: ‘Rwanda: the Great Genocide
Debate’. According to the conference blurb: ‘This conference will
examine how the genocide consensus has stifled criticism’ of human
rights violations and violent attacks by the Rwandan RPF regime since
1994. Africa Direct has members working in aid organisations,
including the former press officer in CAFOD (Catholic Action for
Overseas Development), and there have been complaints about their
coverage of Rwanda from Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal of African
Rights, among others (African Rights, personal communications).""
Denial is also being used as a legal strategy by defence lawyers at the
Arusha trials. Let us assume that there are indeed wrongdoings by the
present government of Rwanda, and that the Arusha trials are being
conducted in a less than fair manner. Even if these points are conceded,
this has nothing to do with whether or not there was genocide in
Rwanda in 1994. Alleged killers may be brought to trial quite
improperly. The RPF may kill unarmed civilians and attack refugee
camps (Africa Direct cites attacks on Mugunga camp, for example).
But these violations of human rights, if they occur, although they
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deserve exposure, cannot be tied in with the issue of whether or not
there was genocide of Batutsi Rwandans in 1994.
The Rwanda genocide of 1994 is now established fact. To question
it is criminally irresponsible, and analogous to ‘holocaust denial ’,
which is now outlawed in some countries in the EU. Similar legislation
might be proposed in the case of the genocide in Rwanda. As the
opening quotation from Prunier suggests, distorting the meaning of the
genocide of 1994 is tantamount to complicity in the genocide itself,
since it dehumanises further those who were targeted and killed. To
give an analogy for the sake of clarifying the argument: if the present
racialist and militaristic policies of Israel towards its neighbours and
Palestinian people were taken as evidence that there was no genocide
of Jews during the Second World War, there would be outrage. The
same rejection of false logic should also be maintained in the Rwandan
case.
Historians, novelists, journalists and filmmakers (among others)
continue to examine the legacy of the Nazi Holocaust and to draw
lessons from this experience for the present generation. In the same
way, we need to continue to examine the implications of the 1994
genocide in Rwanda in order to draw out its lessons for humanity.
What happened to the Batutsi in Rwanda is in many senses comparable
to what happened to the victims of other historical genocides in the
modern period. There are many parallels with the Holocaust, some of
which need much more exploration than has been possible here, and
could form the basis for interesting doctoral theses in the future. Such
issues certainly continue to be deserving of attention, whatever the
current geo-political situation in the Great Lakes region. The possibility
of truly comparative research on modern genocides is sadly emerging,
and can now include an African example of that phenomenon (Palmer
1998). The differences between the genocides of Armenia, Germany
and Rwanda are many and obvious. But so too are the parallels, and
these differences and parallels are worth investigating in future. In
understanding the significance of what is classified as a ‘crime against
humanity’, double standards are unhelpful to scholarship. This is
admittedly a very difficult, contentious and highly sensitive field, but
genocide needs to be understood, whoever plans it, whoever are the
victims, and in whichever part of the world it happens. Although this
seems unlikely, if the Batutsi rulers in Burundi were ever to decide on
and be able to implement the systematic extermination of the Bahutu
population of that country, that too would be genocide. The 1994
genocide in Rwanda would not be a mitigating circumstance for the
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Burundian regime, but neither would it be relativised by any genocide
in reverse that might conceivably take place in Burundi.
notes
1. A good example of blaming genocide entirely on the West is Chossudovsky 1994 : 24–6, also
in Chossudovsky 1997. For other examples, see Prunier 1995 : 157, and Republic of Rwanda 1995.
For an excellent account of different perspectives on the impact of colonial theories and history,
see Mamdani 1996.
2. The Baktwa and Iguni, two castes of ‘pygmies ’, are potters and hunter-gatherers
respectively. They are rarely mentioned at all in recent accounts of events in Rwanda and
Burundi, though see, for example, Waller 1996 : 4. The low average income of the Twa compared
with either Hutu or Tutsi is noted in Prunier 1995 : 40. One of the few pieces of evidence suggesting
the Twa suffered heavily prior to and during the genocide is in Bunting 1997.
3. One of the most notorious leaders of the militias, Robert Kajuka (sometimes written Kajuga)
was himself the son of a Tutsi woman. He was leader of the Impuzamugambi militia of the extremist
‘Hutu Power’ CDR (Coalition for the Defence of the Republic) and a notoriously ruthless killer.
The same pressures to conform led a tiny number of Jews to join the SS for safety, hoping to hide
their origins by being ‘exemplary’ within the organisation.
4. I am grateful to Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, of the Department of History of the University
of Dar-es-Salaam and one of the leaders of the Congolese Democratic Movement, for bringing this
point home to me. He reminded me of the importance of state crises as an explanation of
particular strategies adopted by political elites. In Rwanda, the combination of severe economic
crisis with political contestation of the ruling minority, and military vulnerability that led to more
harshly divisive state policies from late 1980s onwards, culminated in preparation and
implementation of genocide in 1994. Thanks to Ikaweba Bunting for insights and encouragement
(1997).
5. Exploitative reciprocity is the term used by Barrington Moore (1978 : 60). On the
oversimplification of ethnic boundaries, and the implications of it, see for example Codere 1973 :
353, and Prunier 1995 : 45–6.
6. The first chapter in Braeckman (1996), for example, suggests that Flemish and Walloon
colonial officials and church leaders projected their mutual dislike of each other onto the Batutsi
and Bahutu. This idea is criticised on empirical grounds by Filip Reyntjens in a review of
Braeckman’s book in De Standaard (Antwerp), 21 November 1996.
7. For the pollution of Lake Victoria, see Courrier International, No. 188, 9–15–7.1994, p. 34. In
discussion in October 1997, Helen Hakiza, Ugandan national and former MSc student at the
Centre for Development Studies, University of Wales Swansea, reported that Ugandans stopped
eating tilapia for at least a year after April 1994.
8. Nahimana’s (1993) study was based on his detailed historiographical studies of the
independent Bahutu kingdoms of the north-west of Rwanda, the region from which the akazu
originated.
9. African Rights (1996) provides a detailed and graphic description of how ‘revelations ’ were
staged in order to convince the local Bahutu population that their Batutsi neighbours were in fact
supporters of the RPF. The report described how the local populations initially united to seek out
the interahamwe militias and kill them. Akayesu, who was mayor of a small commune in the south
of Rwanda, resisted orders to commit genocide for ten days. He later became the first person to
be prosecuted by the International Tribunal in Arusha.
10. Palipehutu (sometimes spelled Paripehutu) and Parmehutu are two Hutu-based self-
promotion parties or movements based in Burundi and Rwanda respectively. The difference is
more in their position than their ideologies. Whereas Parmehutu, allied to the MDR (Mouvement
De!mocratique Re!publicain) came to power after the Revolution of 1959 in Rwanda, in Burundi
Palipehutu has remained an outlawed organisation.
11. Africa Direct have distributed their materials on the ‘Great Genocide debate ’ at a number
of African Studies conferences, including the conference at the Leeds African Studies Unit in 1997,
where a version of this paper was originally presented, and where Aidan Campbell was a keynote
speaker. Although apparently consisting of only a few people, Africa Direct is part of the
Revolutionary Communist Party, which edits Living Marxism. See Aidan Campbell’s (1997)
strange book, Western Primitivism: African ethnicity, and his review (1996) of Patrick McAllister &
Edwin Wilmsen (eds.), The Politics of Difference: ethnic premises in a world of power. An example of
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the approach objected to by African Rights is to be found in Fiona Foster (1995, 1996) ; African
Rights ’ co-directors Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal discovered that Fiona Foster was in fact
Fiona Fox, the press officer of CAFOD (correspondence with the author, October 1997). The
March 1996 issue of Living Marxism published a letter of complaint from Efraim Zuroff, Director
of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, along with a reply from Mick Hume, the editor of LM. An
‘Africa Direct Submission to the United Nations Tribunal on Rwanda’ explicitly denied that this
was holocaust or premeditated genocide, and included statements from the defence lawyers of
some of those accused of genocide. One Flemish defence lawyer, Luc de Temmerman, is quoted
as saying ‘We are convinced that there was no genocide. It was a situation of mass killings in a
state of war where everyone was killing their enemies. ’ Apparently contradicting himself, he adds
that ‘Everyone was killing but the real victims are the Hutus ’, Mail & Guardian, Johannesburg,
Saturday, 4 October 1997.
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